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I. CLOTHING AS UNIQUE EXPRESSION 
 
“The items with which we cover our bodies and the ways in which we style 
them are physically located at the border—a manipulable border—between our 
bodies and the rest of the world.”1 All forms of expression, outside of govern-
ment prescription, create or invoke tension between the liberty of a citizen and 
the autonomy of a government to maintain social order. But resolving that ten-
sion becomes more complicated when regulating dress. On one hand, interna-
tional organizations such as the United Nations have declared that the wearing 
of clothes constitutes a human right.2 In fact, even the most permissive countries 
consider dress a social and legal duty, requiring some degree of dress in public.3 
On the other hand, despite the necessity of clothing, dress can also express a 
myriad of different messages. Explicitly, clothing can include written words con-
veying particular statements or even other forms of art.4 Implicitly, clothing—or 
lack thereof 5—can actively or passively signal personal identity,6 protest,7 or any 
of many other messages. Yet still, a wearer may not intend to convey any mes-
sage by the clothing that they wear or may accidentally send a message they do 
not intend.8 
 
 1 Gowri Ramachandran, Freedom of Dress: State and Private Regulation of Clothing, 
Hairstyle, Jewelry, Makeup, Tattoos, and Piercing, 66 MD. L. REV. 11, 13 (2006). 
 2 See, e.g., G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 25 ¶ 1 
(Dec. 10, 1948), https://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights (“Everyone has 
the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his 
family, including . . . clothing . . . .”). 
 3 But cf. discussion infra Sections III.A.1.a, III.B.1.a (concerning nudity as expression 
legal arguments). 
 4 See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (overturning a man’s conviction for 
breaching the peace for wearing a jacket with the words “Fuck the Draft”); cf. Gabrielle 
Bruney, Melania Trump Admitted That She Wore Her “I Really Don’t Care” Jacket to Send 
a Message, ESQUIRE, (Oct. 13, 2018), https://www.esquire.com/news-politics/a23760074/ 
melania-trump-i-really-don-t-care-jacket/ (explaining the meaning of the writing “I Really 
Don’t Care, Do U?” on the First Lady’s jacket was heavily debated for almost three months, 
based on the context of her wearing it at a time of concern about detained children at the 
southern border of the United States). 
 5 See, e.g., City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277 (2000) (accepting that nude dancing 
can be an erotic message). 
 6 Cf. Star v. Gramley, 815 F. Supp. 276 (C.D. Ill. 1993) (an American court refusing to 
make a prison allow an assigned-male prisoner to wear female clothes or makeup to express 
their gender identity). 
 7 See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (finding 
black armbands worn to protest the war in Vietnam to be expressive). 
 8   Cf. Gabrielle Bruney, supra note 4. 
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Despite Western9 states’ reputations for protecting the individual liberties of 
its citizens10—particularly that of expression—these states only indirectly 
acknowledge a legal right to expression through desired clothing. For example, 
since 2004, at least nine other countries and many cities in Europe banned the 
wearing of face coverings in public places,11 and debate surrounding those laws 
focuses on the religious nature of face coverings rather than their donning as a 
purely expressive act.12 International charters vaguely mention “expression” but 
fail to define it.13 Further, universal standards call for places of employment to 
insist on grooming policies, where violations can result in termination.14 In the 
public sphere, most countries limit freedom of expression when such freedom 
interferes with sufficiently strong government interests, such as preventing 
breaches of the peace.15 Perhaps surprisingly, both ideological wings of the pop-
ular political spectrum in representative governments support such restrictions.16 
 
 9 While the “West” or “Western world” is subjective in scope and opaque in literal defi-
nition, it remains a common self-identifying term among the populace of certain nations. See 
Western World, SCIENCEDAILY, https://www.sciencedaily.com/terms/western_world.htm (last 
visited Oct. 18, 2020) (“In the contemporary cultural meaning, the phrase ‘Western world’ 
includes Europe, as well as many countries of European colonial origin with substantial Euro-
pean ancestral populations in the Americas and Oceania.”). 
 10 See The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), EUR. COMM’N, https://ec.europ 
a.eu/anti-trafficking/legislation-and-case-law-international-legislation-general-declarations/u 
niversal-declaration-human_en (last visited Sept. 18, 2020) (calling the West-dominating 
U.N.’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights the “first global expression of rights to which 
all human beings are entitled”). 
 11 The list of European nations with full or partial bans on face-covering dress includes 
Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, France, Germany, Latvia, the Netherlands, and Nor-
way. Marta Rodriguez Martinez & Veronica Sarno, Has COVID-19 Destroyed the Case for 
Banning the Burqa in Europe?, EURONEWS (Sept. 28, 2020), https://www.euronews.com/2020 
/09/23/has-covid-19-destroyed-the-case-for-banning-the-burqa-in-europe. 
 12 See, e.g., El-Alloul c. Att’y Gen. of Que., 2018 CarswellQue 8475 (Can. Que.) (WL) 
(the Quebecois court finding that wearing a head scarf for religious purposes is expressive and 
thus worthy of protection). 
 13 For example, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states: “Everyone has the right 
to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without 
interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and 
regardless of frontiers.” Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 2, at art. 19. 
 14 See, e.g., Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1106 (9th Cir. 2006) (en 
banc) (a female bartender was terminated for refusing to wear makeup, which was not consid-
ered a prima facie case for discrimination). 
 15 See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 569–72 (1942) (a Jehovah’s Witness 
repeating “offensive, derisive and annoying words and names” constituted fighting words and 
thus promoted a breach of the peace); see also Gough v. United Kingdom, App. No. 49327/11 
(Oct. 28, 2014), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-147623 (recounting a nudist’s decision 
to be constantly nude in public and in court, which constituted a serial breach of the peace). 
 16 Compare David A. Graham, A Brief History of the GOP War on Yoga and Its Pants, 
ATLANTIC (Feb. 11, 2015) (cataloguing American conservatives’ attempts to expand indecent 
exposure laws, including to “tight-fitting beige clothing”), with Sarah A. Harvard, Western 
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And despite the encroachment of non-conformist millennials on entrenched po-
litical power,17 recently governments have enacted new and highly publicized 
legal restrictions of certain forms and choices of dress in recent years.18 
Yet nothing about such restrictions surprise us, despite the decades-long rise 
in cries for protection of the freedom of speech. Governments have controlled 
bodies and body coverings for at least thousands of years. “Sumptuary laws,” 
which codify how individuals of different social classes and roles may dress in 
various dimensions, hallmarked legal systems from 215 B.C. until only the last 
few centuries.19 As of 2020, sumptuary laws are much harder to identify and 
much more readily justified by concerns other than maintenance of class struc-
tures. Yet laws targeting the specific clothing habits of disenfranchised minori-
ties evidence that modern clothing expression restrictions approximate the ef-
fects of long-established class-based legal repression.20 
This Note will explore the legal doctrines restricting and protecting clothing 
expression rights in the United Kingdom and two of its former colonies, the 
United States of America and Canada. It seeks to identify how countries that are 
historically linked by a suppressive sumptuary code treat modern expression 
through clothing. Analyzing jurisprudence specific to clothing expression helps 
to tease out an expressive right that closely cleaves to body autonomy and can 
highlight sumptuary-style justifications that are inconsistent with modern sensi-
bilities. As the only form of expression universally considered a human need,21 
 
Liberals Claim Burqa Bans Protect Muslim Women. These Experts Say Otherwise., MIC (May 
19, 2017) (left-enacted face-veil bans in Europe on arguably paternalistic, atheistic bases). 
 17 For millennials, the ability to adopt a non-uniform personal aesthetic appears to be more 
important than for prior generations. This is directly reflected in broad relaxation of corporate 
dress codes. See Sarah Landrum, Are Millennial Employees Driving Casual Dress Codes?, 
FORBES (June 16, 2017, 1:49 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/sarahlandrum/2017/06/16/ 
are-millennials-driving-casual-dress-codes/#6668dcb83cc1 (pointing to various factors shift-
ing workplace dress codes, including the transfer of economic power to tech-savvy young 
people, relaxed “decency” standards, and a general philosophical shift to focus on the internal 
over the external). 
 18 See, e.g., Dariano v. Morgan Hill Unified Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 764, 770 (9th Cir. 2014) 
(concerning two American high school students who were sent home for wearing shirts de-
picting the American flag, on the basis that they were at risk of harm from other students). 
 19 Sumptuary Law, ENCYC. BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/topic/sumptuary-
law (last updated Feb. 6, 2009). 
 20 See, e.g., Andre Perry, Dress Codes Are the New ‘Whites Only’ Signs, HECHINGER REP. 
(Feb. 5, 2020), https://hechingerreport.org/dress-codes-are-the-new-whites-only-signs (spot-
lighting examples of dress codes targeting Black students for having dreadlocks, hair exten-
sions, or preventing them from wearing traditional head wraps). Note that choice of hairstyle 
or dress is far from the only form of cultural expression targeted by the legal system. See, e.g., 
ANDREA L. DENNIS & ERIK NIELSON, RAP ON TRIAL: RACE, LYRICS, AND GUILT IN AMERICA 
(2019) (showing that rap lyrics depicting violence are more often treated as evidence than 
similarly violent lyrics from other musical genres). 
 21 See Purpose of Clothing, TEXTILE SCH., https://www.textileschool.com/500/purpose-
of-clothing-10-reasons-to-wear-clothes (last updated Oct. 20, 2018) (giving ten reasons to 
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clothing expression deserves more than simplistic, abstracted, or secondary sta-
tus in legal discussions on fundamental rights. 
Section II of this Note assesses the historical background of clothing expres-
sion rights in each country of this review in turn, starting with the oldest (the 
United Kingdom) and ending with the youngest (Canada). Section III focuses on 
the legal doctrines of each nation, first providing the context for clothing expres-
sion litigation in the country, both the relevant historical background and modern 
developments. Each subsection of Section III will examine major clothing ex-
pression litigation in up to three procedural forms: broad restrictions in certain 
settings, specific restrictions on disenfranchised populations, and restrictions 
through individual adjudications. Section IV then offers conclusions of the dis-
tinctive characteristics of each nation’s free expression jurisprudence. 
Ultimately, the United States offers a relatively unclear and dispersed protec-
tion of clothing expression. Because of its strong common law tradition and fed-
eralist ideals, each state’s judicial bodies and local governments enjoy significant 
discretion to cling to sumptuary ideals. In contrast, the U.K. utilizes uniform and 
strong nation-wide protections for traditional forms of clothing expression. The 
U.K. appears to protect the wearing of clothing until the murky subject of “of-
fense” may invoke an ancient, potentially classist response. Canada provides the 
clearest example of strong clothing expression protection jurisprudence, eschew-
ing tradition for “reasonableness.” 
 
II. HISTORY OF LAWS TARGETING CLOTHING 
 
For millennia, humans maintained laws strictly limiting what different citizens 
and non-citizens could wear.22 These are the most visible form of sumptuary 
codes, systems of restrictions on personal expression ranging in seriousness and 
invasiveness across history.23 While several academic lenses help explain the 
 
wear clothes, including a need for protection, safety, and sanitation). Compare Susan B. Kai-
ser, Fashion and Identity, LOVETOKNOW, https://fashion-history.lovetoknow.com/fashion-hist 
ory-eras/fashion-identity (last visited Sept. 17, 2020) (arguing that it is vital that individuals 
“announce who they are” through appearance), with Frederick Rosen, Basic Needs and Jus-
tice, 86 MIND 88 (1977) (arguing that the concept of “need” is ambiguous and that there are 
multiple levels of “need” for clothing). Note that while clothes are a need, the fashion industry 
is such a major economic driver in developing countries that clothes are relatively cheap. See 
How Fast Fashion is Destroying Developing Countries, 1 MILLION WOMEN (Feb. 12, 2016), 
https://www.1millionwomen.com.au/blog/how-fast-fashion-destroying-developing-countries 
. 
 22 Sumptuary Law, supra note 19. 
 23 Barton Beebe, Intellectual Property Law and the Sumptuary Code, 123 HARV. L. REV. 
809, 812 (2010) (footnotes omitted) (“A society’s sumptuary code is its system of consump-
tion practices, akin to a language . . . by which individuals in the society signal through their 
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impact of sumptuary codes throughout history, academia rarely debates that 
sumptuary codes were a tool used to enforce and perpetuate classism in many 
classical societies.24 
A.  Sumptuary Law in the United Kingdom: Old Habits 
The term “sumptuary law” originally comes from medieval England. Medie-
val English governments used laws targeting “sumptuousness,” i.e. luxury,25 to 
theoretically prevent sin and over-consumption that they deemed a detriment of 
society, and to actually control spending.26 While the laws targeted all forms of 
social habits and behavior, laws restricting clothing were constantly visible and 
may seem absurd by modern standards.27 Nonetheless, the history of such re-
strictions is long and explicitly classist. For a stark example, the only law passed 
by English Parliament in the year 1337 banned the wearing of fur and imported 
cloth, but excepted persons of lord-status or higher to wear fur and “the King, 
Queen, and their Children” to wear imported cloth.28 
Through the next three centuries, prohibitions and restrictions in England only 
increased in number and degree. Lower-class persons were required to wear 
badges or even brands to denote their class rank, all with the stated justification 
of preventing poverty and crime.29 In contrast to higher modern scrutiny on the 
dress of women, English sumptuary codes at that time more exhaustively re-
stricted clothing for men than for women.30 In addition, U.K. sumptuary laws 
 
consumption their differences from and similarities to others.”). In his exhaustive analysis, 
Professor Beebe’s article focuses on intellectual property law as a modern, global incarnation 
of sumptuary codes. This Note focuses on non-commercial and non-commercial-litigation 
methods of enforcement of personal dress. 
 24 See, e.g., id. at 813 (stipulating that elitism is a basis of sumptuary law in general, as 
controls over consumption of luxury goods were imposed when the governing classes come 
to believe that levels of consumption no longer reliably differentiated various classes of soci-
ety); cf. Peter Goodrich, Signs Taken for Wonders: Community, Identity, and a History of 
Sumptuary Law, 23 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 707, 724 (1998) (“What the history of sumptuary reg-
ulation most enduringly transmits is a sense of the dependence of law upon the construction 
and maintenance of images of propriety, reason, and authority.”). 
 25 Sumptuous, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster.com/di 
ctionary/sumptuous (last visited Sept. 15, 2020). 
 26 See generally RUTHANN ROBSON, DRESSING CONSTITUTIONALLY: HIERARCHY, 
SEXUALITY, AND DEMOCRACY FROM OUR HAIRSTYLES TO OUR SHOES (1st ed. 2013) (compre-
hensively examining American constitutional litigation regarding dress). 
 27 See Beebe, supra note 23, at 812–13 (using as an example a 1463 English ordinance 
limiting the extent to which shoes could extend beyond toes of persons “of rank” to two 
inches). 
 28 See ROBSON, supra note 26, at 8–9 (“The banning of wearing fur contained a more 
extensive exception for ‘the King, Queen, and their Children, the Prelates, Earls, Barons, 
Knights, and Ladies.’”). 
 29 Id. at 10–15. 
 30 Id. at 12. 
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occasionally addressed sexuality, in explicit provisions for ignoble males and 
female sex workers.31 
B. Clothing Speech Rights in the United States of America: Enumerated 
Freedoms for Some 
The U.K. and the United States legally separated centuries ago, and while the 
two share a language and some cultural norms, the United States has faced its 
own unique clothing expression issues throughout its shorter history. Before the 
United States declared its independence from England, colonists regulated dress 
with sumptuary laws enforcing a puritan aesthetic, as well as a distinct method 
of badging wrongdoers with certain letters made of cloth, often scarlet as in the 
eponymous novel.32 Unlike medieval Britain,33 the colonies’ laws targeted 
women, and women often broke them for wearing an excess of lace.34 Moreover, 
the restrictions did not uniformly target all women. For example, laws denied 
free women of color the right to wear headdresses.35 
After the United States revolted from Britain,36 the Founders considered add-
ing a sumptuary provision of the Constitution, but never ratified one.37 Sumptu-
ary law believers such as George Mason and John Adams argued that sumptuary 
laws enabled civic republicanism by promoting equality of dress.38 That sump-
tuary conception of equality never took hold.39 Instead, the United States condi-
tionally adopted the Constitution with the addition of a Bill of Rights which enu-
merated certain freedoms, including the “freedom of speech.”40 
The Bill of Rights, in theory and as strictly written, provided explicit personal 
protections against government overreach. Yet in interpretation and 
 
 31 Id. at 12–13. 
 32 See ROBSON, supra note 26, at 21 (referring to NATHANIEL HAWTHORNE, THE SCARLET 
LETTER (1850); relying on 1–3 Records of the Governor and Company of the Massachusetts 
Bay in New England: Printed by Order of the Legislature (Nathaniel B. Shurtleff ed.) (1853)) 
(specifying Massachusetts Bay Colony). 
 33 See discussion infra Section II.B (discussing the history of sumptuary laws in the U.K.). 
 34 ROBSON, supra note 26, at 23. 
 35 Africans in French America, NAT’L PARK SERV., https://www.nps.gov/ethnography/aah 
/aaheritage/frenchama.htm (last visited Oct. 29, 2020). 
 36 See ROBSON, supra note 26, at 28 (attributing the revolution at least in part to commer-
cial restrictions of commodities including apparel, such as the British Hat Act, which restricted 
the ability of Americans to make hats and Thomas Jefferson labeled “an instance of despotism 
to which no parallel can be produced in the most arbitrary ages of British history”). 
 37 Id. at 31. 
 38 Id. at 31–32. 
 39 Id. at 32. 
 40 U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the 
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a 
redress of grievances.” (emphasis added)). 
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enforcement, the panoply of constitutional rights only counted for white male 
citizens and only against the federal government.41 State governments could 
openly deny the rights of disenfranchised groups until the ratification of the Four-
teenth Amendment in 1868.42   
Perhaps the most egregious sumptuary restrictions of clothing in modern his-
tory appeared in the Southern slave codes, a legal framework designed to ensure 
immediate identification of slaves and “to avoid stoking ‘theire foolish pride.’”43 
The codes not only enforced style upon slaves but limited the material of their 
clothing; for example, Virginia required slaves to wear blue canvas and South 
Carolina detailed “a variety of cheap, rough fabrics ‘not exceeding ten shillings 
per yard.’”44 After emancipation, Jim Crow laws enabled rampant discrimination 
in local laws approximating the effects of sumptuary codes.45 Slowly America 
repealed many laws segregating and otherwise openly discriminating against 
people of color, but more subtle policing of Black bodies and expression lives on 
in dress codes targeting aesthetics specific to Black culture today.46 
During the nineteenth century, private rules slowly replaced most sumptuary 
laws. For example, many demanded workplace uniforms to “help identify mem-
bers of the working class and to further retain the visual hierarchy that was no 
 
 41 One example is the right to vote, which while required for the existence of the demo-
cratic representative government in the United States, was not provided to non-white or non-
male citizens. See U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1 (granting the right to vote to non-white per-
sons); U.S. CONST. amend. XIX (granting the right to vote to non-male persons). 
 42 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive 
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”). 
 43 Lucille M. Ponte, Echoes of the Sumptuary Impulse: Considering the Threads of Social 
Identity, Economic Protectionism, and Public Morality in the Proposed Design Piracy Prohi-
bition Act, 12 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 45, 64 (2009) (quoting KATHLEEN M. BROWN, GOOD 
WIVES, NASTY WENCHES, AND ANXIOUS PATRIARCHS: GENDER, RACE, AND POWER IN 
COLONIAL VIRGINIA 154 (1996)). 
 44 Ponte, supra note 43 (quoting BROWN, supra note 43). 
 45 KAREN E. FIELDS & BARBARA J. FIELDS, RACECRAFT: THE SOUL OF INEQUALITY IN 
AMERICAN LIFE 34 (2012). 
 46 See Perry, supra note 20 (reporting that a student was suspended mere months before 
graduation for wearing his hair in dreadlocks, with the superintendent “implying that dread-
locks are linked to bad performance”). In addition to marginalization and targeting, Black 
American identity is still co-opted, exploited, and even desecrated by White Americans in a 
multitude of public ways. For arguably the most extreme example, see Wil Haygood, Why 
Won’t Blackface Go Away? It’s Part of America’s Troubled Cultural Legacy, N.Y. TIMES 
(Feb. 7, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/07/arts/blackface-american-pop-culture.ht 
ml (describing the first performance of Thomas Dartmouth Rice’s “Jump Jim Crow” in black-
face); see also Samara Lynn, Bots in Blackface—The Rise of Fake Black People on Social 
Media Promoting Political Agendas, BLACK ENTER. (Aug. 22, 2019), https://www.blackenterp 
rise.com/bots-in-blackface-the-rise-of-fake-black-people-on-social-media (finding fake social 
media profiles meant to suppress Democratic votes). 
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longer mandated by law.”47 Throughout the twentieth century, the United States 
grappled with chaotic shifts in its demographics48 and wealth distribution,49 
which necessitated more comprehensive understanding of the boundaries of con-
stitutional rights.50 Judges reacted to these gradual but overwhelming shifts with 
sudden, dramatic holdings, broadly applying rights in entirely new or newly-ac-
cepted contexts.51 Such holdings would inevitably clash with groups that pre-
ferred the status quo of distinct class distinctions and associated sumptuary re-
quirements. 
U.S. society has been on high alert regarding legal decisions over the freedom 
of speech for decades. Although great debate surrounds the details, the Supreme 
Court explicitly understands “speech” to include “expressive conduct.”52 The 
Court’s jurisprudence evolved to treat laws impacting such expression differ-
ently, based on whether statutes deliberately target the content of expression.53 
The Court classifies laws that deliberately target the content of expression as 
“content-based,” and laws that do not as “content-neutral.”54 The Court subjects 
content-based laws to the “strict scrutiny” standard: for constitutional validity, 
they must be “narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.”55 On the 
 
 47 Ponte, supra note 43, at 64. 
 48 See generally U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CENSR-4, DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS IN THE 20TH 
CENTURY 1 (2002), https://www.census.gov/prod/2002pubs/censr-4.pdf (finding that during 
the 20th century: the share of American persons in metropolitan areas almost tripled, the me-
dian age increased by over 50%, the number of non-Southern states with populations of at 
least 10% minority races increased from two to twenty-six, and the Hispanic population more 
than doubled). 
 49 See Chad Stone et al., A Guide to Statistics on Historical Trends in Income Inequality, 
CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES, https://www.cbpp.org/research/poverty-and-inequality/ 
a-guide-to-statistics-on-historical-trends-in-income-inequality (last updated Jan. 13, 2020). 
 50 The power of the Court—and its existence as a political institution—was made glar-
ingly obvious to the American public with Roosevelt’s open threat to pack the court to ensure 
the constitutionality of the New Deal. FDR Announces “Court-Packing Plan”, HISTORY, 
https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/roosevelt-announces-court-packing-plan (last 
updated Feb. 4, 2020). 
 51 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 114 (1973) (establishing that women have an 
inherent right to abort a pregnancy in certain scenarios). 
 52 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406–07 (1989) (finding that while the American gov-
ernment “generally has a freer hand in restricting expressive conduct than it has in restricting 
the written or spoken word,” it is not “the nature of the expression, but the governmental in-
terest at stake, that helps determine whether a restriction on that expression is valid”). 
 53 See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 320 (1988). But see Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 
U.S. 155 (2015) (where the holding was unanimous but the majority and each of the three 
concurring opinions had different methodologies to explain when a law was “content-based”). 
 54 Boos, 485 U.S. at 324. 
 55 Boos, 485 U.S. at 334; see also First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 
785–86 (1978) (finding a plain violation of the First Amendment where “the legislature’s sup-
pression of speech suggests an attempt to give one side of a debatable public question an ad-
vantage in expressing its views to the people”). 
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other end of the spectrum, the Court subjects a content-neutral law only inci-
dentally affecting expression to a test established in United States v. O’Brien.56 
The O’Brien test requires the law to further an “important” governmental interest 
“unrelated to the suppression of free expression” in a fashion “no greater than is 
essential to the furtherance of the government interest.”57 In the middle, the Court 
subjects a content-neutral law directly targeting the time, place, or manner of 
expressive content to a lower standard of “intermediate scrutiny”: for constitu-
tional validity, it must be “narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental 
interest, and . . . leave open ample alternative channels for communication.”58   
Recently, appellate courts have upheld bans on the wearing of certain flags,59 
and prosecutors may use clothing that appears to symbolize gang membership as 
evidence for sentencing enhancements, including the death penalty.60 Outcomes 
of such cases continue to stir up ideological controversy and form modern tinder 
for the ancient accusation that American law often fails to provide equal protec-
tion to all of its citizens.61 
C.  Clothing Expression Rights in Canada: Global Considerations 
Britain granted Canada legislative freedom in 1926,62 and the Constitution of 
Canada was later signed into law in 1982,63 making Canada’s break from Britain 
 
 56 United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 382 (1968) (“[B]ecause of the Government’s 
substantial interest . . . [the law at issue] is an appropriately narrow means of protecting this 
interest and condemns only the independent noncommunicative impact of conduct within its 
reach . . . .”). 
 57 City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 278 (2000) (holding O’Brien to establish an 
applicable test). 
 58 Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984). 
 59 See, e.g., State v. Mitchell, 288 N.E.2d 216, 219 (Ohio Ct. App. 1972) (holding that a 
man violated a state flag statute by embroidering a representation of the flag upon a patch on 
the seat of his jeans). 
 60 See, e.g., State v. Gonzalez, 345 P.3d 1168, 1178 (Utah 2015) (finding that even though 
evidence of gang membership is improper as back door to introducing character evidence, trial 
courts may admit gang-related evidence such as clothing when it does not relate to the “bad 
acts”); Anderson v. State, 901 S.W.2d 946, 950 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (holding that evidence 
of membership with a gang that had a bad reputation was admissible during the punishment 
phase of a murder trial because it was relevant to his character). 
 61  Cf. Derek W. Black, The Contradiction Between Equal Protection’s Meaning and Its 
Legal Substance: How Deliberate Indifference Can Cure It, 15 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 533 
(2006) (arguing the Supreme Court’s “intent standard” for equal protection is fundamentally 
flawed). 
 62 See Statute of Westminster 1931, 22 & 23 Geo. 5 c. 4, § 4 (UK), http://www.legislation. 
gov.uk/ukpga/Geo5/22-23/4/section/4 (providing legislative but not constitutional autonomy 
from the U.K.’s parliament). 
 63 See Proclamation of the Constitution Act, 1982, LIBR. & ARCHIVES CAN., 
https://www.bac-lac.gc.ca/eng/discover/politics-government/proclamation-constitution-act-
1982/Pages/proclamation-constitution-act-1982.aspx (last visited Sept. 16, 2020) (describing 
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much more recent than that of the United States. Section Two of the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, a bill of rights entrenched in the constitution 
from its conception, lists freedom of speech as a “fundamental” freedom.64 No-
tably, the section groups freedom of expression with the freedoms of “thought, 
belief, [and] opinion.”65 However, the freedom is not absolute. Section One of 
the Charter allows the state to subject enumerated rights and freedoms to “such 
reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and 
democratic society.”66 Such justification requires that Canadian laws pass a two-
step test established in R. v. Oakes.67 The first step requires a “pressing and sub-
stantial” objective relating to “societal concerns.”68 The second step constitutes 
a proportionality test with three components: (1) the law must be “carefully de-
signed to achieve the objective . . . and rationally connected to that objective”; 
(2) it should impair the right or freedom as little as possible; and (3) there “must 
be a proportionality between the effects of the limiting measures and the objec-
tive.”69   
Despite the seemingly straightforward Charter and Oakes test, Canadian juris-
prudence faces unique expression issues as an indirect result of its history and 
relationship with France. While the United States lacks an official, federally 
mandated language,70 and the U.K. only legally requires English and Welsh in 
Wales,71 Canada is federally bilingual, requiring both English and French in leg-
islation and adjudication.72 However, since the 1970s, Quebec only recognizes 
French as its official language, and deliberately enacted multiple laws to curtail 
the use of English.73 Moreover, Quebec adjudicates civil law matters under a 
 
the history behind the signing of the Canadian Constitution). The signing was performed by 
Queen Elizabeth II, who remains Queen and Head of State in Canada in a capacity separate 
from her role as the British monarch, though it appears to be a mostly honorary title. Her 
Majesty Queen Elizabeth II, GOV’T OF CAN., https://www.canada.ca/en/canadian-heritage/serv 
ices/royal-family/queen.html (last visited Sept. 16, 2020). 
 64 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being 
Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c 11, § 2(b) (U.K.). 
 65 Id. 
 66 Id. § 1. 
 67 R. v. Oakes, [1986] S.C.R. 103, ¶ 73–74 (Can.). 
 68 Id. ¶ 73. 
 69 Id. ¶ 74. 
 70 Harmeet Kaur, FYI: English Isn’t the Official Language of the United States, CNN, 
https://www.cnn.com/2018/05/20/us/english-us-official-language-trnd/index.html (last up-
dated June 15, 2018). 
 71 Official Languages Scheme, NAT’L ASSEMBLY FOR WALES, https://www.assembly.wale 
s/en/abthome/about_us-commission_assembly_administration/official_languages/Pages/ols.a 
spx (last visited Sept. 18, 2020). 
 72 Official Languages Act, R.S.C. 1985, c 31 (4th Supp.) (Can.), https://laws-lois.justice.g 
c.ca/PDF/O-3.01.pdf. 
 73 See Official Languages Act, S.Q. 1974, c 6 (Can.), https://www.uottawa.ca/clmc/officia 
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constitution-like Civil Code, based on and inspired by the Napoleonic Code of 
1804.74 As a result, majorly-publicized expression disputes typically revolve 
around the clash between federal freedom and Quebec’s unique restrictions.75 
III. MODERN CLOTHING EXPRESSION DOCTRINES 
Since the Age of Enlightenment, sumptuary laws explicitly prescribing dress 
for certain social classes all but disappeared from legal codes of the U.K. and its 
former colonies.76 But modern legal theorists, such as Carleton University’s Pro-
fessor Alan Hunt, believe sumptuary laws live on in ordinances, such as those 
targeting pornography.77 Judges uphold, ignore, or strike down such ordinances, 
so examination of litigation is a useful method to find the practical impacts and 
interpretations of more subtle laws affecting personal expression. 
A. Clothing Expression Litigation in the U.K. 
The United Kingdom lacks a written constitution providing for the protection 
of freedom of expression, but in 1973 the U.K. joined twenty-eight countries in 
the European Union (EU) in 1973,78 and in 2000 it incorporated the European 
Convention on Human Rights (Convention) into its domestic law under the Hu-
man Rights Act.79 Article 10 of the Convention protects freedom of expression, 
 
l-language-act-1974 (making French the sole official language of Quebec); see also Kamila 
Hinkson & Loreen Pindera, Only Quebecers Legally Entitled to go to English School Have 
Right to be Served in English, Premier Says, CBC NEWS (Nov. 5, 2019. 8:21 AM) (reporting 
that Premier Legault stated that immigrants must only receive government services in French, 
while the “historic English minority” would be able to receive all services in English). 
 74 Where Our Legal System Comes From, CAN. DEP’T OF JUST., https://www.justice.gc.ca/ 
eng/csj-sjc/just/03.html (last modified Oct. 10, 2016). The Civil Code explicitly protects pri-
vacy and autonomy rights in various ways. See Civil Code of Quebec, S.Q. 1991, c 64 (Can.). 
 75 See, e.g., Rob Quinn, Quebec Tells French Woman She Failed to Prove Ability to Speak 
French, NEWSER (Nov. 8, 2019, 3:01 AM) (reporting that a French woman moved to complete 
her PhD at a French-language school in Quebec and applied to a fast-track program to settle 
in Quebec, but was rejected because one of the five chapters of her thesis was written in Eng-
lish). 
 76 Cynthia Crossen, Why Sumptuary Laws, Despite a Rich History, Never Lasted Very 
Long, WALL ST. J. (June 15, 2009, 11:59 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB11187851319 
2859553. 
 77 ALAN HUNT, GOVERNANCE OF THE CONSUMING PASSIONS: A HISTORY OF SUMPTUARY 
LAW 361, 389 (1996) (arguing that “sumptuary laws did not so much ‘die’ as undergo a process 
of transfiguration or metamorphosis such that the original is barely recognizable in the result-
ant”). 
 78 The EU in Brief, EUR. UNION, https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/eu-in-
brief_en (last visited Sept. 18, 2020) (explaining that the E.U.’s main purpose was free trade 
and movement of people within the network). 
 79 The Human Rights Act, EQUAL. & HUM. RTS. COMM’N, https://www.equalityhumanrigh 
ts.com/en/human-rights/human-rights-act (last updated Nov. 15, 2018). 
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which includes the freedom to “receive and impart information and ideas without 
interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers.”80 However, the Con-
vention also subjects freedom of expression to various restrictions as “necessary 
in a democratic society,” including “for the protection of health or morals, [and] 
for the protection of the reputation or rights of others.” 81 Additionally, a popular 
but unproven theory holds that U.K. citizens maintain a negative right to freedom 
of expression under the common law, such that they may not be forced to express 
themselves.82   
The Convention fails to define “expression” with particularity, though such an 
observation applies to each constitution in this review.83 Typically, courts may 
hold laws incidentally impacting expression unlawful only when case law estab-
lishes that something traditionally accepted as “expression” suffers an impact. 
However, mere participation in a traditional activity, such as foxhunting, does 
not meet the definition of “freedom of expression to ‘physical and visible partic-
ipation in the cultural life of [a] community.’”84 
Note that on February 1, 2020, the U.K. became the first member state to with-
draw from the EU. Its withdrawal may call into question the precedential value 
of twenty years under the Convention (and various other legal arrangements in-
cluding matters of trade, financial services, and intellectual property).85 
 
 80 Council of Europe, European Convention on Human Rights, as Amended by Protocols 
Nos. 11 and 14, Supplemented by Protocols Nos. 1, 4, 6, 7, 12, 13 and 16, art. 10 ¶ 1 (1950). 
 81 Id. at 13. 
 82 See Gillberg v. Sweden, 1676 Eur. Ct. H. R. 471 ¶ 86 (2010) (holding that there was no 
right to withhold research when it was work-product created while under employment, but 
also holding that “[t]he Court does not rule out that a negative right to freedom of expression 
is protected under Article 10 of the Convention”). 
 83 See Council of Europe, supra note 80 (“Everyone has the right to freedom of expres-
sion. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information 
and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers.” (emphasis 
added)); see also Canadian Charter, c 11, § 2(b) (U.K) (“Everyone has the following funda-
mental freedoms: . . . (b) freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including free-
dom of the press and other media of communication”); U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall 
make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . . . .”). 
 84 Whaley v. Lord Advocate, [2004] S.C. 78, 119–20 (Scot.) (finding two foxhunters 
could not justify striking the Protection of Wild Mammals Act for preventing expression of 
their foxhunting culture). 
 85 See generally COMPLEXITY’S EMBRACE: THE INTERNATIONAL LAW IMPLICATIONS OF 
BREXIT (Oonagh E. Fitzgerald & Eva Lein, eds., 2018) (a compilation of private academic 
papers involving implications of Brexit). 
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1. Broad Restrictions in Certain Settings 
a.  In “Public” 
International and U.K. news monitor developments in the EU regarding the 
possibility and reality of bans on “facial veils” in public places, enacted as a 
reaction to traditional Muslim clothing that covers the face apart from the eyes.86 
France, a proudly secular nation,87 enacted a ban on Islamic facial veils which 
was not modified even when face masks became mandatory at the height of the 
COVID-19 pandemic.88 Despite the Convention’s explicit protection of freedom 
of expression as a right, the European Court of Human Rights found that the 
French ban did not violate the right to freedom of expression, right to privacy, or 
freedom of religion.89 Nonetheless, despite a number of calls for facial veil bans 
in the U.K., none came close to succeeding, with public pushback to suggestions 
for one.90 
On the opposite end of the spectrum from veils, which the U.K. has not yet 
banned, is the U.K.’s negative treatment of nudity. Nude dancing and even sun-
bathing maintains healthy popularity around the world, but few nations consider 
nudity itself to constitute a form of expression.91 In the U.K., one man who be-
lieved in free social nudity was arrested forty-two times for refusing to wear 
clothes in public or in court.92 When he complained that his repeated convictions 
breached the Convention, the European Court of Human Rights held that the 
plaintiff’s nudity could not be unjustly interfered with as a form of expression.93 
However, it also held that British officials rightfully exercised discretion in con-
sidering the impact of the plaintiff’s nudity on the community on each particular 
occasion.94 Moreover, although existence as a nudist could constitute part of the 
 
 86 The Islamic Veil Across Europe, BBC NEWS (May 31, 2018), https://www.bbc.com/ 
news/world-europe-13038095. 
 87  See Vijay Singh, French State School Today Is an Incarnation of Its Secular Tradition, 
INDIAN EXPRESS (Nov. 7, 2020, 9:04 AM), https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/ 
france-secularism-emmanuel-macron-islamic-radicalism-6981220/. 
 88 Jason Silverstein, France Will Still Ban Islamic Face Coverings Even After Making 
Masks Mandatory, CBS NEWS (May 12, 2020, 5:09 PM). 
 89 SAS v. France, [2015] 60 EUR. H.R. REP. 11. 
 90 Conservative Chairman Calls for Apology from Boris Johnson over Burka Remarks, 
BT NEWS (Aug. 7, 2018, 2:12 PM), https://jerseyeveningpost.com/news/uk-
news/2018/08/07/conservative-chairman-calls-for-apology-from-boris-johnson-over-burka-
remarks/. 
 91 See, e.g., S. Fla. Free Beaches, Inc. v. City of Miami, 734 F.2d 608, 610 (11th Cir. 1984) 
(agreeing with another court’s opinion that “[n]udity is protected as speech only when com-
bined with some mode of expression” (quoting Chapin v. Town of Southampton, 457 F. Supp. 
1170, 1174 (E.D.N.Y. 1978))). 
 92 Gough v. United Kingdom, App. No. 49327/11 (Oct. 28, 2014). 
 93 Id. at 26. 
 94 Id. at 27. 
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plaintiff’s identity—and maintaining a nude state could be expression of his per-
sonality—”a distinction must be drawn between carrying out an activity for per-
sonal fulfillment and carrying out the same activity for a public purpose.”95 Thus, 
an act of protest did not qualify for protection.96 The court also noted that even 
if the plaintiff alleged a claim under Article 9 of the Convention, which facially 
protects “beliefs” that may include a belief in social nudity, such beliefs must 
meet requirements of “cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance.”97 
b.  In “the Workplace” 
Litigation in the U.K. appears defendant-friendly in interpreting the aims of 
dress policies in workplaces. In Kara v. United Kingdom, a British man who 
preferred to wear “women’s clothing”98 applied to the European Commission on 
Human Rights, alleging an interference with privacy, prevention of his self-ex-
pression, and discrimination on the basis of sex when a dress code forced him to 
wear “men’s clothing.”99 The Commission agreed that such a code constituted 
an interference with private life as protected by Article 8(1) of the Convention, 
but found the interference justified under Article 8(2) of the Convention.100 Spe-
cifically, the court found that the dress code safeguarded the employer’s “public 
image and facilitate[ed] its external contacts.”101 
2. Specific Restrictions on Disenfranchised Populations 
Even though the United Kingdom lacks a written constitution, it made explicit 
through legislation that education constitutes a fundamental human right within 
its own jurisdiction.102 However, while lower U.K. courts have found that such 
a right may enhance and embolden freedom of expression, the upper courts do 
not always feel the same. In R. v. Denbigh High School, a female Muslim student 
alleged that her high school violated her access to education by enforcing a dress 
code that prohibited her desired religious covering.103 The lower court found that 
this violated the right to education, but the Appellate Committee of the House of 
Lords disagreed.104 The House of Lords found that where a student could apply 
 
 95 Id. at 26. 
 96 Id. at 27. 
 97 Id. 
 98 For an argument that it is erroneous to assign gender to clothing, see Galia Godel, Cloth-
ing Has No Gender, CEREBRAL SEXUALITY (June 19, 2018), https://cerebral-sexuality.com/20 
18/06/19/clothing-has-no-gender. 
 99 Kara v. United Kingdom, 27 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 272, 273 (1999). 
 100 Id. at 273–74. 
 101 Id.at 274. 
 102 Human Rights Act 1998 c. 42, sch. 1, part 2, art. 2. 
 103 R. v. Denbigh High Sch. [2006] UKHL 15, [2007] 1 AC 100 (appeal taken from Eng.). 
 104 Id. 
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to transfer to another school, a school’s restriction on the student’s religious garb 
did not “exclude” the student from her right to education.105 
B.  Clothing Expression Litigation in the United States 
What defines “free expression” in the U.S. legal sphere? U.S. courts usually 
fail to clarify, often merely stipulating an act’s expressive nature or relying on 
the determinations of precedent.106 For example, the Supreme Court held that a 
person’s choice to act “passive during a flag salute ritual” constitutes expres-
sion,107 but that “being in a state of nudity” without something more (like danc-
ing) does not.108 While the general public increasingly accepts personal clothing 
style as a form of expression, legislatures frequently enact and justify state laws 
directly prescribing certain clothing as combating “secondary effects” of cloth-
ing under the auspices of individual states’ broad “police power.”109 
1. Broad Restrictions in Certain Settings 
a.  In “Public” 
The most visible examples of clothing restrictions take place in “public 
places,” where, by default, the citizenry at large may most easily witness the 
effects of prohibitions and complain to the government if they are unfair. Gener-
ally, U.S. courts allow operators of county fairs or other public events to pro-
scribe wearing specified types of “clothing or accessories they reasonably be-
lieve might lead to substantial disruption of or material interference with the 
event.”110 However, the legality of such private prohibitions is murkier when it 
comes to adequacy of notice and law enforcement discretion. The Court found a 
dress code impermissibly broad when “it is impossible to objectively determine 
whether the wearing of particular apparel or accessories is or would be thought 
by a law enforcement official to be within the ambit of its prohibitions.”111 
Cohen v. California is perhaps the most famous U.S. case of clothing expres-
sion in a public place.112 In 1971, a day after one million college and high school 
 
 105 Id. 
 106 See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 790 (1989) (“Music is one of 
the oldest forms of human expression.”). 
 107 W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 633–34 (1943). 
 108 City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 278 (2000). 
 109 See id. at 279 (the ordinance at issue purported to combat “crime and other negative 
secondary effects caused by the presence of adult entertainment establishments”). 
 110 Gatto v. Cnty. of Sonoma, 98 Cal. App. 4th 744, 777 (2002); see also Mutual Loan Co. 
v. Martell, 222 U.S. 225, 232 (1911) (explaining that the police power grants legislatures au-
thority to preserve the “public health, safety, morals, or general welfare”). 
 111 Gatto, 98 Cal. App. 4th at 775. 
 112 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 16 (1971). 
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students boycotted class in opposition to the Vietnam War,113 police arrested 
Paul Cohen in the Los Angeles County Courthouse for wearing a jacket that vis-
ibly read “Fuck the Draft.”114 The California State Court of Appeal upheld a 
conviction of “disturb[ing] the peace” under the California Penal Code,115 hold-
ing that the defendant’s passive conduct constituted “offensive conduct,” which 
could “cause others to rise up to commit a violent act against the person of the 
defendant or attempt to forceably [sic] remove his jacket.”116 
On appeal, the Supreme Court found the justification for this conviction lack-
ing in persuasive power for several reasons.117 First, the California Penal Code 
section at issue applied throughout the entire state, rather than tailored to indi-
vidual settings that might invite a “decorous atmosphere.”118 Second, while evoc-
ative, the Court did not find the words “obscene,” which the Court limits to sig-
nificantly “erotic” language.119 Third, the words on the jacket did not constitute 
“fighting words,” and “[n]o individual actually or likely to be present could rea-
sonably have regarded the words on appellant’s jacket as a direct personal in-
sult.”120 
Perhaps the most interesting reason the Court found the statute overbroad in 
this application concerned the rights of “unwilling or unsuspecting viewers” sub-
jected to the words on the jacket.121 The Court found that while government may, 
at times, shut off discourse solely to protect others from hearing it, the Court 
“consistently stressed that ‘we are often “captives” outside the sanctuary of the 
home and subject to objectionable speech.’”122   
 
 113 MARK D. HARMON, FOUND, FEATURED, THEN FORGOTTEN 32 (2011). 
 114 Cohen, 403 U.S. at 16. 
 115 Id. (quoting CAL. PENAL CODE § 415 (repealed 1974)) (the statutory language prohibited 
“maliciously and willfully disturb[ing] the peace or quiet of any neighborhood or person . . . 
by . . . offensive conduct”). 
 116 Cohen, 403 U.S. at 17 (quoting People v. Cohen, 1 Cal. App. 3d 94, 99-100 (1969)). 
 117 Cohen, 403 U.S. at 17. 
 118 Id. at 19. 
 119 Id. at 19–20 (such eroticism-focused “obscenity” falls into “those relatively few cate-
gories of instances where prior decisions have established the power of government to deal 
more comprehensively with certain forms of individual expression simply upon a showing that 
such a form was employed”). 
 120 Id. at 20. 
 121 Id. at 21. 
 122 Id. (citing Rowan v. U. S. Post Off. Dep’t, 367 U.S. 728 (1970)). The Court simultane-
ously “recognized” the proposition that “unwelcome views and ideas which cannot be totally 
banned from the public dialogue” may be prohibited by governments to maintain the “privacy 
of the home.” Cohen, 403 U.S. at 21. 
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State prohibitions on public nudity comprise the most common and tradi-
tional123 broad restrictions on clothing expression in public.124 U.S. laws regard-
ing nudity and “public indecency” differ among states,125 but generally the law 
prohibits nudity in public places, as well as on personal property when the nude 
person exposes themself to the public.126 Most state laws promulgate specific 
rules about nudity around children and nudity intended to arouse oneself or an-
other person, but some states leave specificity to community standards.127 Of 
course, the fact that such laws exist unchallenged does not mean they pass con-
stitutional muster. 
Despite furor over female nipples in public, the U.S. protection of liberty typ-
ically allows men to expose their nipples in public. The Eleventh Circuit found 
unconstitutional a gender-neutral ordinance in Palm Beach, Florida, prohibiting 
the exposure of nipples, specifically because it prohibited the exposure of male 
nipples.128 The court found no reasonable relationship between male shirtless-
ness and the town’s history, tradition, identity, or quality of life—a threshold 
required to show a “legitimate interest in the personal dress of [the town’s] citi-
zens at large.”129 In a footnote of the court’s opinion, the Eleventh Circuit indi-
cated that an asserted moral interest would require a uniform prohibition of male 
nipples both in-town and on the beach, and the beach prohibition specifically 
targeted females.130 
Like most beaches, private businesses can constitute “places of public accom-
modations,” and thus are subject to laws targeting establishment-affecting com-
merce131 if they are not “private clubs.”132 In City of Erie, the U.S. Supreme 
Court found that an ordinance prohibiting “public nudity” can constitutionally 
 
 123 One might reasonably quarrel with use of the breadth of the word “traditional” in this 
context, as traditions change dramatically over time. See, e.g., Kristin Toussaint, This 
Woman’s One-Piece Bathing Suit Got Her Arrested in 1907, BOSTON GLOBE (July 2, 2015), 
https://www.boston.com/news/history/2015/07/02/this-womans-one-piece-bathing-suit-got-
her-arrested-in-1907(spotlighting Annette Kellerman, a competitive swimmer and later a si-
lent-movie star, who was arrested for wearing a one-piece swimsuit in a time when women 
typically swam in dresses and stockings). 
 124 Note that the federal government’s prohibitions on nudity generally pertain to the mil-
itary. 
 125 Georgia’s Public Indecency law prohibits “in a public place . . . (3) A lewd appearance 
in a state of partial or complete nudity.” GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-8 (2019). 
 126 See Nudity and Public Decency Laws in America, HG.ORG, https://www.hg.org/legal-
articles/nudity-and-public-decency-laws-in-america-31193 (last visited Sept. 16, 2020). 
 127 Id. 
 128 DeWeese v. Town of Palm Beach, 812 F.2d 1365 (11th Cir. 1987). 
 129 Id. at 1367–68. 
 130 Id. at 1368 n.7. 
 131 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000(a)-(b) (prohibiting discrimination or segregation in places of pub-
lic accommodation). 
 132 See 42 U.S.C. § 12187 (allowing an exemption to public accommodation laws for pri-
vate clubs and religious organizations). 
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regulate nude dancing inside commercial establishments.133 The Court’s justifi-
cation relied on a federalism ideal, giving discretion to the city’s “efforts to pro-
tect public health and safety [which] are clearly within its police powers.”134 The 
Court found that when an ordinance has a “de minimis” impact on the dancers’ 
expression—there, requiring nude dancers to wear pasties and G-strings—it can-
not be “content based.”135 While applying the O’Brien test,136 the Court reiter-
ated its de minimis justification to satisfy the requirement that the restriction “is 
no greater than is essential to the furtherance of the government interest.”137 
City of Erie only exemplifies several federal appeals cases finding female nip-
ple exposure as non-essential to expression, as one could express the same erotic 
message without “dropping the final stitch.”138 One may wonder whether or not 
every Supreme Court decision increases the power of the message behind remov-
ing that final stitch. 
b.  In “the Workplace” 
The United States jurisprudence regarding dress codes in the workplace per-
mits employers substantial deference, such that finding litigation that ultimately 
found for the employee is difficult.139 Further, the government subjects its own 
employees—especially police, teachers, firefighters, and soldiers—to standards 
which may seem overly harsh compared to the private sphere. As such, federal 
employer discretion over the physical appearance of employees may comprise 
the upper limit for valid restrictions in the United States. 
U.S. police serve as perhaps the most interesting study of the power of the 
United States over public employees. The police manifest the power of states to 
exercise their “police powers,” but they also exist as individual citizens with in-
dividual rights. The dichotomy came to a head in Kelley v. Johnson, where a 
police officer named Kelley argued that the judicial deference given to the regu-
lation of soldiers could not apply to police officers.140 Kelley claimed that a hair 
 
 133 City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 279 (2000). 
 134 Id. 
 135 Id. 
 136 See discussion supra Section II.B (explaining the O’Brien test). 
 137 City of Erie, 529 U.S. at 280. 
 138 Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 587 (1991) (Souter, J., concurring) (plural-
ity opinion) (“Dropping the final stitch is prohibited, but the limitation is minor when meas-
ured against the dancer’s remaining capacity and opportunity to express the erotic message.”); 
see also J&B Entm’t, Inc. v. City of Jackson, 152 F.3d 362 (5th Cir. 1998) (finding that a local 
ordinance restricting dancers wearing G-strings and pasties only restricted expression as much 
as was necessary to achieve the state’s purpose). 
 139 But see Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 
884 F.3d 560 (6th Cir. 2018) (concerning a Title VII action alleging that the employer had 
fired its transgender employee because she refused to abide by its conception of her gender). 
 140 Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238 (1976). The “unique judicial deference” to military 
regulations applies, at least, to hair-cutting regulations. Id. at 246. 
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regulation statute violated his retained individual right to liberty under the Due 
Process clause.141 The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the government’s 
“wide latitude” in the “dispatch of its own internal affairs” required only a “ra-
tional connection” between the regulation and the exercise of its police pow-
ers.142 The Court thus impliedly held that police officers’ obligations as public 
officials overwrite their individual liberties to some degree. 
2.  Specific Restrictions on Disenfranchised Populations 
a.  Inmates 
Perhaps recognizing the continued military armament and dominance of the 
United States in the international community, the Court maintains that “no gov-
ernmental interest is more compelling than the security of the Nation.”143 While 
“security of the nation” often refers to international threats, domestic government 
security services supervised the imprisonment of over one and a half million peo-
ple144 and jailing of over ten million in 2016.145 Unfortunately, the U.S. Supreme 
Court has not communicated the extent of prisoners’ fundamental rights involv-
ing clothing.146 Incarceration with surveillance precludes a full right to privacy, 
which only increases its punitive value. Rules mandate that most prisoners wear 
cheaply made uniforms, without enabling customization that could express indi-
viduality.147 
For prisoners in demographic minorities, infringements on personal identity 
can resemble the old sumptuary laws which reinforce the grant of different ex-
pressive rights to different social classes. The particular treatment of transgender 
prisoners exemplifies modern and implicit but fundamental differences in the 
fundamental expressive rights of different sectors of adult society.148 Despite the 
 
 141 Id. at 244. 
 142 Id. at 247. 
 143 Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307 (1981). 
 144 BUREAU OF JUST. STATS., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., NCJ 251149, PRISONERS IN 2016 (Aug. 
7, 2018), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p16.pdf. 
 145 BUREAU OF JUST. STATS., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., NCJ 251210, JAIL INMATES IN 2016 (Feb. 
22, 2018), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ji16.pdf. 
 146 But see Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 512 (1976) (“[T]he State cannot, consistently 
with the Fourteenth Amendment, compel an accused to stand trial before a jury while dressed 
in identifiable prison clothes . . . .”). 
 147 See, e.g., FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, INMATE INFORMATION HANDBOOK 11 (2012) 
(“Clothing . . . alterations . . . will be handled by Clothing Room staff only. Clothing which 
has been altered by an inmate could result in disciplinary action.”). 
 148 Before changes in the 2013 edition, the American Psychiatric Association effectively 
recognized transgenderism as a medical and mental disorder, placing expression of personal 
identity of transgender persons in the hands of third parties (physicians). See Ally Windsor 
Howell, A Comparison of the Treatment of Transgender Persons in the Criminal Justice Sys-
tems of Ontario, Canada, New York, and California, 28 BUFF. PUB. INT. L. J. 133, 137 (2010). 
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authority of physicians to control the process and expense of transitioning, many 
states enact additional procedural barriers making it difficult to transition, pursue 
rights, or perform regular duties while identifying to a gender other than the one 
assigned at birth.149 Thus, beyond the personal safety concerns of assigning 
transgender persons to prisons of their birth-assigned gender,150 prisons usually 
force transgender persons to wear clothing that expresses the opposite of their 
gender identity. 
While the U.S. Supreme Court has not recently ruled on the processing of 
transgender people in prison, it has denied the chance to overrule various state 
statutes and regulations that prevent imprisoned transgender people from exer-
cising a right to freedom of expression. In Star v. Gramley, an Illinois district 
court considered the plight of a transgender plaintiff who desired to wear makeup 
and “female” apparel.151 The court found that no right to express oneself wearing 
clothing could overcome a “legitimate security concern[].”152 Perhaps surpris-
ingly, the court accepted the prison’s victim-blaming argument that allowing fe-
male accoutrements would “provoke and/or promote homosexual activity or as-
sault, thereby creating safety and security risks.”153 
While at least one Supreme Court case established that federal laws protecting 
religious expression can impact prison grooming policies,154 the Court has not 
explored the legal space for clothing as its own form of expression in prison. As 
the Court accepts the tight control of expression within federal prisons, clothing 
cases generally concern the inadequacy of the quality of clothing provided.155 As 
such, federal appellate courts have heard only two cases related to freedom of 
expression without relying on another right, one of them extremely tangential.156 
 
 149 See id. at 143 (noting that states can make a variety of facilitating procedures easier or 
more difficult, including changing name or sex on documents of identification and prohibiting 
discrimination on the basis of gender identity). 
 150 The Bureau of Justice Statistics estimated that from 2011–2012, 39.9% of 3,209 
transgender prisoners were sexually victimized in prison. BUREAU OF JUST. STATS., U.S. DEP’T 
OF JUST., NCJ 241399, SEXUAL VICTIMIZATION IN PRISONS AND JAILS REPORTED BY INMATES, 
2011–2012 (2018), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/svpjri1112_st.pdf. 
 151 Star v. Gramley, 815 F.Supp. 276 (C.D. Ill. 1993). 
 152 Id. at 278. 
 153 Id. 
 154 See Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. 352 (2015) (finding the Department of Corrections groom-
ing policy burdened a Muslim prisoner’s exercise of religion under the Religious Land Use 
and Institutionalized Persons Act). 
 155 See, e.g., Smith v. Mobley, 532 F.3d 1270 (11th Cir. 2008) (an inmate complained about 
wearing substandard clothing in winter weather conditions). 
 156 See Robinson v. Boyd, 276 F. App’x 909 (11th Cir. 2008) (in a short per curiam deci-
sion, the Eleventh Circuit found that the defendant was not constitutionally protected against 
discipline by a correctional officer when he asked to wear “warm gear” and then argued with 
the response). 
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Weaver v. Jago, a Sixth Circuit case, is the only federal appellate case that has 
considered a true expression-in-prison argument.157 There, the defendant argued 
that prison officials violated his “right to govern his personal appearance and his 
right to the free expression of his African heritage” by promulgating and enforc-
ing a hair length regulation.158 The lower court granted summary judgment for 
the prison, which the Sixth Circuit reversed.159 The court recognized that the 
“State’s interest in maintaining order and discipline must be shown to outweigh 
the inmates’ First Amendment rights.”160 However, despite acknowledging the 
defendant’s “right to govern his personal appearance and his right to the free 
expression of his African heritage” argument, the panel apparently reversed 
based solely on the third “freedom of religious expression” argument.161 Exam-
ining federal jurisprudence thus indicates that the United States provides little to 
no constitutional protection for clothing expression for inmates. 
b.  Children 
Clothing expression lawsuits almost always involve children and, specifically, 
children’s rights to wear what they want to school. At least ninety-two U.S. Su-
preme Court cases have dealt with the First Amendment in the context of chil-
dren’s expression in schools,162 and the sheer bulk, range, and history of issues 
inherent in school dress codes have concerned thousands of journal articles and 
hundreds of treatises.163 The volatile combination of compulsory school attend-
ance, parental rights, traditional state authority over education, the idealism of 
youth, and hormones perpetuate a Tolkien-esque164 battle of policy, adjudicated 
state by state and claimant by claimant.165 
 
 157 Weaver v. Jago, 675 F.2d 116 (6th Cir. 1982). 
 158 Id. at 117. 
 159 Id. at 119. 
 160 Id. 
 161 Id. at 118 (emphasis added). 
 162 See generally Randy J. Sutton, Application of First Amendment in School Context—
Supreme Court Cases, 57 A.L.R. FED. 2D 1 (2011). 
 163 See, e.g., Lotem Perry-Hazan, Freedom of Speech in Schools and the Right to Partici-
pation: When the First Amendment Encounters the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 
2015 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 421 (2015); RONNA GREFF SCHENIDER, EDUCATION LAW: FIRST 
AMENDMENT, DUE PROCESS AND DISCRIMINATION LITIGATION (2019); Mitchell J. Waldman, 
What Oral Statement of Student is Sufficiently Disruptive so as to Fall Beyond Protection of 
First Amendment, 76 A.L.R. FED. 1 (2011). 
 164 See Battle of Five Armies, TOLKIEN GATEWAY, http://tolkiengateway.net/wiki/Bat-
tle_of_Five_Armies (last visited Sep. 18, 2020) (explaining that the “Battle of Five Armies” 
in J.R.R. Tolkien’s The Hobbit was a fantastical battle between many factions). 
 165 See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213 (1972) (stipulating that “[p]roviding 
public schools ranks at the very apex of the function of a State” but still holding that Wisconsin 
must show with particularity why it would not grant an exemption to Amish children whose 
high school attendance would be contrary to the Amish religion and way of life). 
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Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District persists as the 
eminent case outlining U.S. doctrine on the freedom of clothing expression in 
schools.166 Protesting a policy enacted by principals in Des Moines, three stu-
dents from two different high schools and one junior high school chose to wear 
black armbands to publicize their objections to hostilities in Vietnam.167 As a 
result, the schools suspended the three students.168 The Supreme Court found that 
students “are ‘persons’ under our Constitution . . . possessed of fundamental 
rights which the State must respect . . . [and] may not be confined to the expres-
sion of those sentiments that are officially approved.”169 The Court pointed to a 
special interest in presenting a robust exchange of ideas to students, describing 
the classroom as a “marketplace of ideas.”170 It further articulated that students’ 
education in school does not stop at the classroom but extends to every interac-
tion with other students.171 The Court found that schools must allow students to 
express opinions on campus unless their conduct “materially disrupts classwork 
or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others.”172 As the 
black armband demonstration did not invite disruption, disorder, or invasion, the 
prohibition was unconstitutional.173 
As far as clarity, the Tinker standard provides little. Since Tinker, lower courts 
have held that, when satisfied, the Tinker “material disruption or substantial dis-
order or invasion” standard does not preclude all content-based limitations.174 
While courts have upheld bans on Confederate flags on clothing across the coun-
try,175 the results of litigation regarding other expression appear to depend on 
whether school officials have a fear of disruption, regardless of whether such 
disruption occurs. A Nevada court held that any reasonable jury could conclude 
that a ban on T-shirts honoring students killed by gang members created a “spe-
cific and significant fear . . . [of] disruption.”176 A New Jersey court rejected a 
school’s argument that it could prohibit students from wearing “Hitler youth” 
 
 166 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
 167 Id. at 504. 
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 169 Id. at 511. 
 170 Id. at 512. 
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 174 See, e.g., Westfield High Sch. L.I.F.E. Club v. City of Westfield, 249 F.Supp.2d 98, 
111 (Mass. Dist. Ct. 2003). 
 175 See, e.g., Hardwick ex rel. Hardwick v. Heyward, 711 F.3d 426 (4th Cir. 2013) (holding 
that a school did not violate free speech rights by prohibiting a student from wearing clothing 
displaying the Confederate flag); B.W.A. v. Farmington R-7 Sch. Dist., 554 F.3d 734, 740 
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Amendment if the Tinker standard . . . is met”). 
 176 Kuhr v. Millard Pub. Sch. Dist., No. 8:09CV363, 2012 WL 1402637, at *1 (D. Nev. 
Apr. 23, 2012) (concerning a T-shirt that honored a student allegedly killed by a rival gang, 
which school officials believed would elicit a violent response from rival gangs). 
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buttons because the defendant school failed to demonstrate a fear of disrup-
tion.177 Perhaps the most controversial and widely-panned school dress code de-
cision came from the Ninth Circuit, which found constitutional an assistant prin-
cipal giving students a choice to remove their shirts displaying the U.S. flag or 
leave school with an excused absence. 178 That court found that the assistant prin-
cipal reasonably believed that wearing the shirts would cause substantial disrup-
tion or violence to the educational environment.179 Perhaps unsurprisingly, the 
decision to prevent U.S. students from displaying the U.S. flag proved to be 
shocking and unpopular across the country.180 
3. Restriction Through Adjudication 
The United States provides wide latitude in the treatment of “gang”181 expres-
sion in legal adjudication, indicating the limitations of “freedom of associa-
tion.”182 While the U.S. Supreme Court hesitates to weigh in on the particulars 
of the treatment of gang clothing expression in criminal proceedings, federal ap-
pellate courts generally differ in treatment of gang expression. Variances in “su-
pervised release”183 restrictions on clothing helps to clarify the reasoning of the 
courts. 
In United States v. Washington, the Eighth Circuit remanded a case where 
supervised release conditions were unconstitutionally vague.184 The condition at 
 
 177 DePinto v. Bayonne Bd. of Educ., 514 F. Supp. 2d 633, 645 (D.N.J. 2007) (rejecting a 
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 178 See Dariano v. Morgan Hill Unified Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 764, 779 (9th Cir. 2014) (hold-
ing that requiring students to change shirts with the American flag raised no violations of 
constitutional rights). 
 179 Id. at 780. 
 180 See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, Not Safe to Display American Flag in American High School, 
WASH. POST (Feb. 27, 2014, 2:35 PM) (accusing the Dariano decision of encouraging “thug-
gery” based on the facts). 
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Cf. WHAT IS A GANG? DEFINITIONS, NAT’L INST. OF JUST. (2011) (stipulating that “[t]here is no 
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of sentencing, and is for the prisoner to serve after completing his or her prison sentence.” 
Monica Steiner, What is Federal Supervised Release?, NOLO (last visited Sept. 18, 2020), 
https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/what-federal-supervised-release.html; see also 18 
U.S.C. § 3583 (2020) (laying out the required conditions for supervised release). But cf. United 
States v. Haymond, 139 S. Ct. 2369 (2019) (finding that 18 U.S.C. § 3583(k), instituting a 
mandatory minimum period of supervised release, was unconstitutional). 
 184 United States v. Washington, 893 F.3d 1076, 1081 (8th Cir. 2018). 
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issue stated: “The defendant must not knowingly associate with any member, 
prospect, or associate member of any gang,” but the court found the term “gang” 
undefined by “any relevant statute” and that “the term ‘associate member’ also 
lacks specific meaning.”185 Further, the Washington court pointed out that the 
Supreme Court “admoni[shed] that ‘association’ should not be read to include 
‘incidental contacts.’”186   
In United States. v. Green, the Second Circuit found a supervised release pro-
hibition from wearing “colors . . . relative to [criminal street] gangs” impermis-
sibly vague under the Fifth Amendment.187 However, the Green court made clear 
that they “uphold broad conditions of supervised release so long as they are suf-
ficiently clear to provide the defendant with notice of what conduct is prohib-
ited.”188 
In United States v. Brown, the Ninth Circuit found a condition of supervised 
release too vague when it prohibited wearing clothing that “may connote” affili-
ation with certain gangs.189 The court employed the “plain error” standard in 
holding the district court was in error for imposing a condition with such breadth 
and indiscriminate nature.190 In contrast, the Sixth Circuit did not reach the ques-
tion of potential vagueness in United States v. Banks, notwithstanding the district 
court failing to state its rationale.191 There, the supervised release of the defend-
ant barred displaying any “reasonably construable sign of gang affiliation.”192 
Despite very broad language, the court found no abuse of discretion, as the con-
dition served the purpose of “deterring future criminal conduct and thus protect-
ing the public.”193 
Washington and Brown stand for one method by which the U.S. legal system 
deals with expression rights as applied to clothing: focusing on how overbroad 
prohibitions create notice issues about clothing protected by the Constitution.194 
The outcomes from different standards of review applied between Brown and 
Banks indicates another, less reliable method, in counting on the discretion of 
individual adjudicators to correct injustices. 
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C. Clothing Expression Litigation in Canada 
Canada stands as the youngest nation in this investigation and occupies a mid-
dle jurisdictional distance between the United States and the U.K., having more 
recently distinguished U.K. law. Reflecting its relatively young age as an inde-
pendent nation, Canada mimicked the EU and enacted a Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms protecting “freedom of . . . expression” within “reasonable limits.”195 
Canada is not a stranger to issues concerning a general right to expression, par-
ticularly in regard to freedom of the press196 and censorship.197 Nonetheless, Can-
ada’s clothing expression jurisprudence indicates a heavy focus on practical is-
sues rather than concerns steeped in tradition. 
1. Broad Restrictions in Certain Settings 
a.  In “Public” 
Legal controversies in Canada regarding clothing expression in public places 
are few and far between, with one exception: courtrooms. As in most justice sys-
tems, Canada’s judges maintain a large amount of independence in deciding the 
procedures associated with their courtroom proceedings, theoretically to help en-
able their impartiality.198 But that independence is limited, as shown in El-Alloul 
c. Attorney General of Quebec.199 In that case, the Quebec Court of Appeal set 
aside the judgment of the trial court, which refused to hear a woman’s case be-
cause she chose not to remove her hijab in the courtroom.200 The trial court de-
termined that the Regulation of the Court of Quebec dress code could forbid 
wearing a hijab, for otherwise the plaintiff’s rights would unduly hinder the au-
thority of judges.201 
 
 195 Canadian Charter, c. 11. 
 196 Canada has experienced pseudo-martial law more recently than both the United States 
and the U.K. In 1970, a Quebecois separatist faction kidnapped the Deputy Premier and a 
British diplomat, and Prime Minister Trudeau invoked the only peacetime use of the War 
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of Quebecois journalists. Dominique Clément, October Crisis, CAN.’S HUM. RTS. HIST., 
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 197 See, e.g., Little Sisters Book & Art Emporium v. Canada, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 1120 (Can.) 
(finding, in a case of LGBT literature importation that was presumed to be obscene, that the 
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ference on Law and Parliament (Nov. 2, 2006) (transcript available at https://www.scc-csc.ca/j 
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204 GA.  J. INT’L & COMP. L. [Vol. 49:177 
The Quebec Court of Appeal disagreed, holding that the dress code could not 
hinder a practice of expressing a sincerely held religious belief unless the practice 
conflicts with an overriding public interest.202 The court noted that a full facial 
covering, such as a niqab—which could hinder proper identification of litigants 
and proper assessment of witnesses’ credibility—might present overriding pub-
lic interest concerns.203 Ultimately, however, the court found a presumption that 
a known religious practice avoids a dress code restriction in a courtroom.204 
b.  In “the Workplace” 
Union protection is a hallmark of Canadian litigation. Unions often challenge 
dress codes and the challenges are usually resolved by arbitration. This often 
includes hospital unions challenging dress codes theoretically meant to promote 
hygiene.205 Decisions often rest on the language of collective bargaining agree-
ments between employer and union, which often give the hospital discretion to 
enforce “reasonable” rules impacting clothing expression.206 
The quasi-judicial power of the Canada Labour Relations Board (CLRB) pro-
tects a specific form of symbolic workplace expression through wearing union 
badges, despite a presumption that such badges encourage confrontation. 
CLRB’s badge cases may indicate that the statutory right to labor organization 
outweighs the right to freedom of expression.207 In I.C.T.U. v. Ottawa-Carleton 
Regional Transit Commission, the CLRB accepted that when employees attempt 
to change bargaining agents, wearing badges to signify their new loyalty “is, as 
a rule, emotional, volatile and, for some, very disturbing and highly trau-
matic.”208 Nonetheless, “[a]ny incidental inconvenience for an employer must be 
weighed against the right of employees to select and belong to a trade union of 
their choice.”209 In Communications Workers of Canada v. A.A.S. Tele-
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 203 Id. ¶ 93. 
 204 Id. ¶ 91. 
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126 L.A.C. 4th 1 (Can. Ont.) (finding a hospital’s prohibition of nose rings violated a collec-
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(Can. L.R.B.). 
 209 Id. 
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Communications Ltd., the CLRB found an employers’ freedom of expression 
limited when it interfered with a trade union, but that collective bargaining “wear 
and tear” did not constitute such interference.210 
c.  Places with Alcohol 
In Saskatchewan, the Safer Communities and Neighborhoods Act (SCNA) 
prohibited “gang colours,” which include “any sign, symbol, logo or other rep-
resentation identifying, associated with or promoting a gang” in premises per-
mitted to have alcohol.211 It defined “gang” to include individuals “who associate 
with each other for criminal or other unlawful purposes.”212 The Saskatchewan 
Provincial Court found the SCNA provision—which was “simply [a] dress 
code”213—”both overbroad and underbroad.”214 Its overbreadth especially con-
cerned the “other unlawful purposes” language, and it thus failed to impair free 
expression as little as reasonably possible.215 The SCNA provision was under-
broad because it only dealt with “wearing,” rather than many other methods by 
which one may display gang colors.216 
While nudity in Canada enjoys technical legality in public in every province, 
adjudications may restrict it in case of potential harm to others. The harm element 
features heavily in litigation regarding nudity in private, including regulations 
binding nudity restrictions to the sale of alcohol. In Rio Hotel v. New Brunswick 
(Liquor Licensing Board), the court held that “freedom of expression” does not 
include nudity with the purpose of driving liquor sales.217 
2. Specific Restrictions on Disenfranchised Populations 
At least prior to COVID-19, Canada as a whole theoretically favored bans on 
the wearing of facial veils.218 Yet case law indicates that Canada’s courts strongly 
conceive of facial veils as expression, allowing for arguments that banning 
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headscarves may constitute a form of persecution.219 However, a sufficiently 
strong, rising security interest may eventually overcome the expression protec-
tion precedent: Canadian doctrine does still allow restrictions based on local po-
lice power interests because “overbreadth exists only if the adverse effect of leg-
islation on individuals subject to it is grossly disproportionate to the state interest 
the legislation seeks to protect or achieve.”220 
3. Restriction Through Adjudication 
Canada maintains a relatively high bar for the constitutionality of strip 
searches, the forced removal of clothing in order to search one’s person.221 After 
Canadian police arrested a man witnessed to traffic drugs, they strip-searched 
him and found a package of cocaine between the man’s buttocks.222  Rather than 
waiting for medical assistance, the officers exerted significant effort to force re-
moval of the package, until finally succeeding.223 The Canadian Supreme Court 
found the search unreasonable for various procedural reasons, as well as a viola-
tion of his fundamental rights, especially by failing to allow the man to remove 
his clothing.224 The Court further denied that an arrested person’s resistance en-




With social and cultural pressures226 provoking nationalistic, xenophobic, par-
tisan, and paternalistic reactions across the world, the United States, Britain, and 
Canada face pressures to litigate the wearing of clothing, marginalizing the 
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expressive aspect in favor of strict necessity considerations. Despite similarity in 
doctrines and language, each of these three nations faced different legal questions 
regarding clothing expression and responded with different levels of respect for 
what approximates a sumptuary tradition. By comparing how each nation has 
typically dealt with sumptuary restrictions, one might better predict what will 
happen when legislatures and judiciaries encounter proposed, enacted, or de 
facto clothing restrictions for the first time. 
United States doctrine is comparatively dispersed and steeped in tradition. The 
doctrine is dispersed due to the nation’s federalist structure, allowing individual 
states to legislate via police powers, despite citizens’ theoretically strong national 
First Amendment protections. The U.S. Supreme Court generally allows private 
restrictions of clothing expression, at least when finding little evidence of partic-
ularized discrimination. Meanwhile, U.S. restrictions may be all-encompassing 
for those suspected, indicted, or convicted of crimes, without much concern for 
the abridgement of their rights. There are also several examples of underbroad 
or overbroad restrictions in public places, with federal courts paradoxically al-
lowing community standards to protect bearing of men’s nipples while ruling 
that dancers revealing nipples only constitutes de minimis expression.  
Ultimately, the validity of U.S. restrictions hinges on legislative intent match-
ing compelling government interests, but there exists no bright-line test for de-
termining such intent. Such ambiguity is ripe for enforcement of secret and ret-
rograde sumptuary concerns. Perhaps most strikingly, the United States more 
clearly allows for restrictions of public officials—especially members of the mil-
itary—than the other two nations. 
United Kingdom doctrine cleaves to history but with strong national protec-
tions for individual dress-related rights, perhaps stronger than that of the United 
States. The U.K. appears relatively generous with government-endowed benefits, 
which shore up expression protections related to certain public spheres. How-
ever, while the U.K. provides strong protections for accepted, clear forms of ex-
pression, the process of reaching acceptance relies on either textualism or a tra-
dition of avoiding offense.  
One could frame the U.K.’s jurisprudence as tacitly enabling sumptuary law, 
though with some active exceptions, including that the U.K. has equivocated on 
protection or condemnation of facial veils. The relative instability of the text of 
the law—suddenly no longer undergirded by the Convention, let alone a written 
constitution—implies significant room for flexibility. The question remains 
whether flexibility will allow for strengthening clothing expression or allowing 
new arbitrary restrictions. 
One could describe Canadian doctrine as reasonableness-based and modern; 
it strongly protects clothing expression and flatly denies morality arguments for 
restriction. Canadian jurisprudence focuses on the “reasonability” of any regula-
tion that impacts the right to wear. The reasonableness standard includes security 
contexts such as strip searches to practical contexts such as hospital dress codes. 
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Canadian litigation strongly upholds the ability to unionize, and to campaign for 
union formation through worn symbols of solidarity. Canada models a liberal 
doctrine weighing individual clothing freedom highly. 
Contrasting these doctrines and their myriad results, it is easier to anticipate 
that nations with relatively dispersed doctrines, including federalist structures 
like that of the United States, may only slowly respond to waves of popular de-
mand for restrictions such as on facial veils. This would likely simultaneously 
slow nation-wide progress in expansion of clothing freedom and forestall popu-
list incursions on existing clothing freedom. In addition, one may also extrapo-
late from Canada’s case law results that “reasonableness”-focused legal systems 
may allow quick judicial adaptation to protect individual clothing freedoms as 
they become relevant, without necessarily allowing populism to infringe on such 
freedoms. On the other hand, giving responsibility to judges to make protective 
law in real time is delegating policymaking authority to usually-unelected ex-
perts with individual beliefs and agendas. The intense scrutiny of and pressure 
on Supreme Court Justices in the United States—usually called “activists” by the 
party which did not affirm them227—may give us pause in choosing to perpetuate 
such a delegation. 
Ultimately, all Americans, Brits, and Canadians should understand why their 
laws exist in the first place, so that they might be more readily improved. Sump-
tuary restrictions of the past perpetuated by elitist or even fascist institutions can 
and have clearly deprived fundamental freedoms such as expression without 
modern justifications.228 To identify and exorcize the specter of sumptuary law 
 
 227  See S.M., Those “Activist” Judges, Economist (July 8, 2015), https://www.economist.c 
om/democracy-in-america/2015/07/08/those-activist-judges. 
 228 For a contrasting perspective that considers sumptuary law vital to maintain the legal 
system’s legitimacy, consider Professor Peter Goodrich’s commentary: 
The detailed workings of law depend . . . not simply upon the institution and 
maintenance of a generalized love of law as the visible principle of social 
authority, but also and equally upon the repetition of that visibility of au-
thority in the disparate regimes of institutional life and the plural regulations 
of the public sphere. 
The lesson of sumptuary law is in large part that . . . the task of legal schol-
arship is to attend to the detail of dress and the other forms of appearance of 
legal and political power. In a critical perspective, the visual surfaces of gov-
ernment should be read not as signs of an otherworldly power or of invisible 
causes but as the very presence and reality of governance in all facets of 
daily life. 
Goodrich, supra note 23, at 724–25. 
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in our modern world will require continuing to shine a light on the justifications 
of modern restrictions and determine whether they are actually long dead. 
